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JOHN V. ZUCKERMAN*

Commercialization of Solar
Thermal Power Generation: Policy
Issuest
INTRODUCTION

Energy from the sun is a concept which has fascinated people ever
since someone first concentrated the sun's rays to produce an intense spot
of heat. The sun has always risen, and scientific evidence suggests that
it will continue to do so in the foreseeable future. Given a state of
technology which enables human beings to reach the moon, and to be
maintained in space for long periods of time and to work there, it appears
reasonable to expect that industrial nations should be able to harness the
sun to provide ever-renewable low-cost energy for various human needs.
The increasing cost of locating fossil fuel resources, and the accom
panying international economic problems of universal demand with con
centration of supply only in certain nations, have engendered research
into various ideas of using sun-power for generating electricity. What is
needed to exploit this sun-power is both technical and economic feasi
bility, and this requires governmental assistance. To bring about economic
feasibility for solar power, government must overcome a number of legal,
policy, and financial obstacles. Solar energy technology must be adapted
to current legal boundaries of society and, at the same time, some legal
boundaries must be modified to accommodate the benefits of the tech
nology. National policy concerning energy needs to be reviewed and
restated. Some existing statutes, and federal regulations and policies,
impede the development of commercial levels of solar thermal power
generation. These can be modified if those who are responsible for writing
and enacting statutes and issuing regulations are convinced of the neces
sity.
*Professor of Organizational Behavior and Management, College of Business Administration,
University of Houston-University Park.
tThis article is based upon a set of studies being conducted at the University of Houston-University
Park under the auspices of the Energy Laboratory, the University's interdisciplinary research center
where scientific, technical, and applications studies have been executed under state, federal, and
university auspices since 1973. The Laboratory is directed by Dr. Alvin F. Hildebrandt, professor
of physics, to whom the author owes a debt of gratitude for his continuous support of the author's
work. All conclusions in this article are the author's personal responsibility, and do not represent
the views of the Energy Laboratory, the University of Houston, nor of Professor Keith W. Blinn of
the University of Houston Law Center, who co-authored with me a brief article published in 9
ENERGY LABORATORY NEWSLEITER 8-11 (1983). Acknowledgment is made to Ms. Phyllis Finger,
who provided library research.
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Without the focused public attention which has been drawn to nuclear
power, without the tremendous outpouring of financial assistance from
the federal government which was applied to nuclear development, with
out even the more moderate financial support devoted to synthetic fuel
production, the utilization of sun-power to generate electricity has come
to technical feasibility. Not only has it been demonstrated, but it has been
made operational. Solar One, described in an accompanying article, is a
technical success.' What is additionally needed is the dimension of eco
nomic success. This article will focus on those aspects of economic
feasibility which delineate the legal, financial, and policy obstacles, and
the possible means of overcoming those obstacJes for solar energy tech
nology in the field of electric power generation. Included are the follow
ing:
(1) A brief review of incentives which have been offered over the past
years by the federal government to encourage the development of energy
resources, including fossil fuels, nuclear energy, synthetic fuels, and
renewable resources, and a statement of the monetary value of those
incentives;
(2) Examination of the statements of national goals for energy in the
United States as they have been espoused by different presidential admin
istrations and expressed concerning solar energy; and
(3) A recommendation for policy, legal, and financial actions to be
taken to produce a climate favorable for the rapid commercialization of
solar thermal power generation.

Background
In September 1973, the United States and other industrialized nations
of the world were brought sharply to the realization that they depended
on a smooth supply of oil from a relatively few middle eastern countries
for the continued operation of a twentieth-century industrial civilization.
Dramatic price increases affected not only the western industrialized na
tions, but the developing nations as well. The past twelve y ears have
been a time of re-examination of and reduction of standards of living,
re-ordering of national priorities, and shouldering large burdens of in
ternational debt, in rich and poor countries alike.2
Generation: The Solar Tower, Progress Toward CommerL Vant-Hull, Solar
cialization, 25 NAT. RES. J. 1099 (1985).
2. The antecedents of the problems of fossil fuel resource supply and the current prospects for
identifying and estimating future supplies of oil and gas, the most utilized fossil fuels, are very
complex mixtures of the status of geology, geophysics. and politics. For an account of the politics
of oil, see LACEY, THE KINGDOM, PART IV, OIL, 225-394 (198]), A concise, yet very readable
summary appears in Browning, Oil and the Gulf: A Survey, THE EcONOMIST 1-50 (Jul. 28. 1984).
Recent estimates of oil and gas potential in offshore fields around the United States are found in a

October 1985]

COMMERCIALIZATION OF SOLAR THERMAL POWER

1147

Between 1973-1979, Americans learned to conserve energy. Industrial
firms began a major effort which has paid off in reduced consumption of
fossil fuels for industrial purposes. Automobile manufacturers have in
creased the fuel efficiency of passenger cars in various ways. The crisis
appeared to be easing when, in 1979, another major petroleum price
increase shocked consumers by its impact on utility rates. 3 Since that
time, there has been an additional shift in the allocation of money re
sources by individuals, and a great deal of attention focused on the size
of utility bills. Because the U.S.population is over eighty-five percent
urban, large numbers of people in cities have become entirely dependent
upon centrally-generated electric power for lighting, heating and cooling,
food refrigeration, maintenance of water pressure, and waste disposal.
Industries, encouraged by the passage of the Public Utilities Regulatory
Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA)4 have successfully constructed generating
devices in conjunction with the production of industrial process steam,
and have been able to reduce their electric bills materially by selling
excess power back to the utilities. However, the policies that have bene
fitted industrial companies have affected utility organizations adversely. 5
The law requires public utilities to buy whatever power is offered to them
at prices which reflect "the full avoided cost" that they would incur if
they generated the power themselves. Disputes concerning what those
full avoided costs are, and what happens to extra expenses incurred by
the utility companies, appear to be increasing the price of power sold to
residential consumers. 6
report of the U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY. OIL AND GAS TECHNOLOGIES FOR THE ARCTIC AND
DEEPWATERS (May 1985). For a brief report providing 1981 Department of the Interior figures
compared with the new 1985 estimates, see Interior Slashes Offshore Oil Estimates, 228 SCIENCE
974 (May 24, 1985). Based upon the data id., the Department of Energy (DOE) has forecast that
imports of petroleum will climb from the current level of about five million barrels per day to about
seven million barrels per day in the 1990s. The Office of Technology Assessment of the U.S.
Congress is even more pessimistic, suggesting that imports may rise to the previous record 9.3
million barrels of oil per day that was reached in 1977.
3. Daly, The Crisis That Drones On, 2 ENERGY LAB. NEWSLETTER 3 (1980).
4. PURPA, which is still in effect but open to amendment by Congress in 1985 or 1986, has
required that public utilities buy electric power from industrial companies which have established
facilities for generating electric power along with industrial process heat, and which from time to
time have excess electric power over their own needs. Utilities must also buy from "small" generating
facilities, and may not have significant ownership of such power generators. This has caused some
real problems. See Nowak, Contract Negotiations under PURPA and the Impact of Recent Devel
opments on Transactions between Electric Utilities and Cogeneration and Small Power Production
Facilities, 3 ENERGY L.J. 273 (1982).
5. A recent report indicates that the largest customer in the United States for cogenerated power
is the Houston Lighting & Power Company (HL&P) which faces major uncertainties in long-range
planning because it must buy all power offered to it. Thus, HL&P may find that its planned fossil
fuel and nuclear generating plants presently under construction are not needed when they are ready
to produce power. Apparently residential customers will have to pay for this unwanted power in
their electric utility bills. Houston Post, Apr. 29, 1985, §6, at I, col. 5.
6. Nowak, supra note 4, at 277.
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The Nuclear Experiment
For many years there has been the vision of a completely new source
of power for the generation of electricity. Nuclear energy was thought to
be a safe and inexpensive source of power even while the nuclear weapon
of World War II was under development. Immediately after the war, the
various executive branch leaders and the Congress teamed up to spend
large sums for research and development to produce nuclear reactors, and
to encourage commercial companies to manufacture them for sale to
public utilities. Since 1953 when the Shippingsport, Pennsylvania, nu
clear generator was put into operation, the industry has grown until about
thirteen percent of electric power distributed to communities throughout
the United States is produced by nuclear resources. 7 Each year the De
partment of Energy (DOE) seeks large appropriations to further the de
velopment of various forms of nuclear power generation, particularly to
enhance the safety of the commercial nuclear fission technology and to
demonstrate the feasibility of nuclear fusion. Controlled nuclear fusion
is currently proposed as a safe, non-polluting source of power but, as
yet, that proposition has not been demonstrated. Additional billions of
federal dollars for research and development may be expended before
nuclear fusion can be proven safe in practice, and some think it will not
be feasible for routine, everyday use at any time in the foreseeable future.
Public disillusionment with nuclear energy has set in and grown as our
attention has been drawn successively to several major problems. The
Three Mile Island accident of 1979 still looms up as a major financial
disaster, with the fallout yet to be determined. 8 Numerous examples of
the problems with nuclear power generators which have been operating
for some time are coming to light. In California, the Humboldt Bay
Power Plant Unit Three, built more than twenty years ago, was hailed
as a pioneer of the atomic age. The owner, Pacific Gas & Electric Com
pany (PG&E), the second largest utility in the nation, said the nuclear
plant was the first one in the United States to generate electricity as
cheaply as could be done with other fuels. Despite several radiation leaks,
this unit operated until 1976 when it had to be closed, seventeen years
earlier than had been planned, because it was located by error over the
San Andreas Fault. Since the 1976 closing, tons of hot isotopes left from
the thirteen years of operation have slowly decayed inside the plant, which
is about 280 miles north of San Francisco. 9
Clearly, nuclear power has failed even as its sponsors have attempted
to convince the public of its safety. Costs have swollen in the past ten
7. Houston Chronicle, Nov. 19, 1984, §2, at 10, col. 6.
8. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

AND CIVILIAN NUCLEAR
POWER: REPORT OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION ALTERNATIVE SYSTEMS ASSESSMENT PROGRAM (1980).

9. Houston Chronicle, Dec. 5, 1984, §4, at 14, col. 5.
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years to ten times previous estimates. Since 1975, eighty-nine nuclear
plants have been cancelled, some within a short time from completion.
There are still predictions, however, that we will have an increase from
the present thirteen percent 10 to as much as twenty percent of our electric
power generated by nuclear reactors by the year 2000. In other countries,
the figures are varied. France utilizes nuclear power for nearly fifty percent
of its electricity generation, but the French government has a record of
not taking policy decisions in the power arena to the public. A recent
study of power generation in eastern European nations within the Soviet
economic bloc indicates a wide variation. Bulgaria secures nearly one
third of its electricity with nuclear power; there is no nuclear reactor
generated electricity in Poland or Rumania; and the USSR is estimated
to generate about six percent of its electricity from nuclear sources. JI
Coal and Synthetics
Since the enactment of strong environmental protection legislation in
the United States, beginning in 1969 when Congress passed the National
Environmental Policy Act, 12 the customary sources for the generation of
electric power have fallen into disrepute. While the United States has
what is estimated to be a three hundred years' supply of coal, the burning
of coal has been decried as a source of severe atmospheric pollution,
particularly in closed-in, urban areas. At the same time that there has
been apprehension concerning the supply of oil and gas, and the safety
of nuclear power, coal has become very expensive to bum in a raw form.
Devices which can be installed to remove a large portion of the noxious
gases and particulates thrown off by burning coal are expensive, and
subject to malfunction. 13 Also, the low sulfur coal which bums with less
pollution is mined in the western states, far from the eastern industrial
sites where it might be burned, and both severance taxes and costs of
transportation have, to all practical purposes, made coal non-competitive
in delivered price. 14
For a number of years it was thought that a long-term solution to the
United States' problem of fossil fuel supply uncertainty might be secured
through the transformation of oil shale, tar sands, or various grades of
coal into synthetic petroleum. Indeed, during the Carter administration
there was proposed to the Congress, investigated thoroughly by both the
executive branch and the congressional research arms, and enacted into
law, a major program of financial support for synthetic fuel in the form
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

See Houston Chronicle, supra note 7.
Franklin & Moreton, COMECON Survey, THE ECONOMIST 13 (Apr. 20, 1985).
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §4321, et seq (1970).
Schefter, Solar Power Cheaper than Coal, Oil, Gas, POPULAR Sc1. 77 (Feb. 1985).
Id. at 78.
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of the Synthetic Fuel Corporation. 15 Synthetic fuel, however, has not been
able to fill petroleum's role. Ethanol can be blended into gasoline in only
a very limited ratio for proper combustion in warm (summer) tempera
tures. Also, there is an economic problem. Synthetic fossil fuel profita
bility has behaved like a will-o-the-wisp; no matter how high the price
of imported petroleum rose, the point of profitability for synthetic petro
leum receded.
NATIONAL GOALS FOR ENERGY

In June, 1979, President Jimmy Carter told the Congress that, as a
result of a domestic policy review, it had been determined that solar
energy could produce as much as twenty percent of U.S. energy require
ments by the year 2000, and that a program for development and energy
funding of his administration would be focused on that goal. It was
planned that the Department of Energy under the Carter regime would
expend nearly a billion dollars for solar energy in 1982.16
In the 1979 Carter administration view of the future, the U.S. popu
lation, they said, is expected to rise from 234 million in 1983 to about
265 million by the year 2000. 17 In addition, in 1976 dollars, the Gross
National Product (GNP) would be about $3.6 trillion in 2000, rising from
$2.6 trillion in 1976, with an increase of about 2.1 percent per year.
Energy demand was expected to rise from 79 quadrillion BTUs in 1980
to 95 quads in the year 2000. At present, in 1985, solar energy, by
government definition including hydroelectric energy and energy gener
ated by burning wood, amounts to about six percent of the total. It would
need to be multiplied by a factor of four to generate the twenty percent
share predicted by President Carter's staff in 1979. 18
To accomplish the four-fold expansion of solar energy proposed by the
Carter administration, it would have taken the $1 billion that the Carter
group planned to spend if they had remained in office in 1982. Such a
commitment would have entailed the utilization of a large number of
federal programs, including the federal funding of research and devel
opment in private companies and universities, and transfer of technology
15. The Senate Budget Committee chaired by Edmund S. Muskie, through its Subcommittee on
Synthetic Fuels with Gary Hart as its chairman, ordered a thorough analysis of the technological
and economic feasibility of producing synthetic fossil fuels by a massive effort of private industry,
funded by the Congress through the Department of Energy, using appropriated funds. Waiving any
in-depth technical discussion, the Committee proceeded to an economic and managerial analysis
provided by consultants. See SUBCOMM. ON SYNTHETIC FUELS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE BUDGET,
96th Cong., 1st Sess, REPORT ON SYNTHETIC FUELS (Sept. 27, 1979).
16. Bezdek, Wendling, Bennington & Chew, National Goals for Solar Energy: Economic and
Social Implications, 22 NAT. RES. J. 337 (1982).
17. Id.
18. Id.
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from the federal establishment to private enterprise. Also on the agenda
would have been financial incentives underwritten by the federal gov
ernment, such as the provision of risk capital at the front end of enterprise
development, or federal subsidies for using solar. modes of power gen
eration and other modalities, to compensate for past subsidies to other
power sources, particularly nuclear power.
In October, 1983, President Ronald Reagan took a quite different po
sition with respect to federal energy development expenditures, having
signalled his intention to do so quite early in his administration through
statements of policymakers. 19 In presenting his National Energy Policy
Plan for 1983 and 1984 to the Congress, President Reagan said that the
hallmark of his policy is "to foster adequate supplies of energy at rea
sonable costs, minimize federal controls and involvement in energy mar
kets, and promote a balanced and mixed energy resource system. " 20
The disparate views of the Carter and Reagan administrations on what
was to be done were based on relatively common views of what the future
will be like, economically and resources-wise. The second Reagan admin
istration has focused on the costs of fossil fuels, assuming that supplies
will be continuously available. The 1983 National Energy Policy Plan
predicted that oil imports will continue to supply about twelve percent
of the nation's energy needs through the year 2000, and that world oil
prices would stabilize in the range of $23 to $30 per barrel, but might
fall if Middle Eastern conflicts ended and the world economy slowed at
the same time. 21 Oil prices in 1990 were forecast at between $26 and $40
in 1982 dollars, or about the same as the $34 price of 1982 in spending
power. Synthetic fuels extracted from coal and shale were estimated at
between $50 and $80 a barrel, compared with the $35 to $50 predicted
in 1979 when Congress approved a $15 billion program to create a syn
thetic fuel industry. 22 The 1983 program makes no direct mention of solar
energy, although the plan states that by the year 2000 the emergence of
alternative energy sources, or technological changes that cannot be an
ticipated, renders current projections of doubtful value. 23 It is not certain
what that statement meant when it was written. The plan did propose the
completion of decontrol of the gas industry, which has now been accom
plished, and decreased regulation of nuclear energy.
When the Reagan administration first entered office in 1981, they made
19. Johnson, National Energy Policy-The Department of Energy's Perspective, 3 ENERGY LJ.
331 (No. 2, 1982).
20. The 1983 National Energy Policy Plan, transmitted to the United States Congress on October
5, 1983, devoted major attention to conservation, finding substitutes for imported oil, and increasing
the strategic petroleum reserves. Houston Post, Oct. 5, 1983, at DI, col.
21. Id.
22. See supra note 15.
23. National Energy Policy Plan, supra note 20.
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major changes in the use of federal incentives, in line with their different
view of the role of the federal government. They also began to remove
federal regulations which had surrounded the energy field, especially since
the 1973 oil embargo. These approaches, very different from those of the
Carter administration, were intended to leave the commercialization of
energy alternatives, particularly that of solar thermal power generation,
to the marketplace. As a result, capital investment to develop solar thermal
power generation as a self-sustained, profit-making venture, has not been
forthcoming.
A recent analysis by the Reagan administration's Department of Energy
highlights that administration's intentions. 24 An analysis was made of
amounts of money devoted to renewable energy research and development
and also to the provision of incentives in the form of tax credits, in which
the Reagan administration specifically compared its actions with those of
the Carter administration. One may note by examination of Table I that
substantial reductions from the Carter Research and Development (R&D)
budget were made during the first Reagan administration. Support for
solar research of all kinds, including central solar thermal power gen
eration as well as other solar energy work, was reduced from a total of
nearly $2 billion in the Carter administration to just over $1 billion in
the Reagan administration. At the same time, the Reagan grants of tax
credits for all types of renewable energy were increased over the tax
credits granted during the last three years of the Carter administration,
six-fold in the case of residential credits, and thirteen-fold in the case of
business tax credits. The clear intention, as stated in the study from which
these data are taken, is to transfer to the business community the re
sponsibility for promoting the commercialization of solar energy actual
ization, with rewards to come only after the business investment, in the
form of the tax credits.
The analysis document states that the $6 billion of incentives-$4
billion in research and development, and $2 billion in tax credits-have
produced renewable energy worth $39 billion calculated at the 1984 world
price of oil. The document also projects that the systems development
generated by the investment, and fostered by the tax credits, will produce
an additional $78 billion in additional energy (at current world oil prices)
during their operational lives. 25
If we take into account the economic uncertainties which have sur
rounded the community of applied technology in this country over the
past four years, we may draw the conclusion that the projections of the
Reagan administration's DOE are optimistic. If we take into account the
24. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY OFFICE OF RENEWABLE ENERGY, RENEWABLE ENERGY

PROFILE 1975-1984
25. Id.

at

3 (Feb. 1985).

Table 1. Estimate of Renewable Energy R&D and Tax Credits*
$ in Millions
Research & Development
Budget Authority

Solar

Geothermal

Hydro-electric

GROF

Total

Carter Administration
(1976---1980)

1,974.88

526.42

61.41

45.18

2,607.89

Reagan Administration
(1981-1984)

1,123.62

295.51

8.95

-16.30

1,411.78

Total R&D

3,098.50

821.93

70.36

28.88

4,019.67

Residential

Business

Tax Credits
Carter Administration
(1978-1980)
Reagan Administration
(1981-1984)
TOTAL TAX CREDITS

Total

242

40

282

1,235

526

1,761

1,477

566

2,043

--

0

�
�
t-�
0

�
�
"ll

0

�
�

*Adapted from: Renewable Energy Profile, 1975-1984, U.S. Department of Energy, February 1985, Office of Renewable Energy, Washington, D.C.

u,
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resource uncertainties of the supply of fossil fuels available for use in
the United States over the foreseeable future, we may believe that re
newable energy sources, particularly central solar thermal power gener
ation, are deserving of the most stimulation that the federal government
can provide, rather than a treatment which has not demonstrated much
effectiveness up to this point. At the same time, it is instructive to review
what the federal government has done to stimulate the development of
all energy forms over an extended period. The availability of a long-term
analysis enables us to review these matters. 26
FEDERAL ENERGY INCENTIVES, 1918-1978

To enhance the development of various sources of energy, the federal
government has provided, over the period from 1918-1978, enormous
amounts of money which flowed to units within the government itself,
and to private entrepreneurs as well. 27 Table II shows the estimated cost
of energy incentives in billions of dollars; the varying sums carry easily
discernable messages. Because the different energy sources became gov
ernment recipients at different times, depending on their stage of devel
opment, it is not possible to make detailed comparisons. Over the past
thirty years during which nuclear power activities were funded by the
government, about $15 billion has been devoted to research, development
engineering, and testing in this area. Over the same period, hydroelectric
power received about $12 billion for the generation and sale of power to
the government, and $5 billion for power transmission. The incentives
provided for coal were an allowance amounting to about $3 billion for
depletion, along with nearly $1.7 billion for research into better mining
methods, development of advanced techniques for liquefying and gasi
fying coal, and fluidized bed combustion techniques, all designed to make
coal a cleaner burning fuel. Oil received the largest single benefit, $40
billion in intangible drilling expense and depletion allowance, while nat
ural gas received $11 billion for those two categories, or 8% of the
incentive funds.
But in spite of the incentive programs of the government, fuel shortages
have appeared from time to time in the United States, or extremely high
spot prices for fuel have hampered industrial and personal economic
development.
NEED FOR AN ASSURED SUPPLY OF ELECTRICITY

If one assumes that economic growth requires a bountiful supply of
energy, one might also assume it would be an important national goal to
26. Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories, An Analysis of Federal Incentives Used to Stimulate
Energy Production 268 (June 1978).
27. Id.

�
�
V,

Table 2. Estimated Cost of Energy Incentives in Billions of Dollars**
Nuclear

Hydroelectric

Coal

Government purchases
of grants
Requirements of
government agencies

Oil

30.3

Gas

3.5

Total

33.8

8
�
Q
::.,:
t"-.

1.2

0.03

Traditional services
paid by government

0.04

0.6

0.2

2.07

1.8

5.0

0.1

6.9

�
:::i
�
�
V)

Non-traditional services
such as research
Market activity
assisting sales

1.7

Tax relief
Totals
Percentages

1.6

14.2

17.1
13%

0.8

16.6

17.5

19.2

1.7

3.0

40.5

11.3

19.23
14%

6.44
5%

77.2

15.l
11%

57%

56.5
$135.07 Billion
100%

�
�
�
�
�
t"-.
"1:l

�
::ti

**Adapted from: An Analysis of Federal Incentives Used to Stimulate Energy Production. Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories, Richland, Washington, June 1978.

V,
V,

1156

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 25

reduce to a minimum the dependency of the United States on energy
sources outside its boundaries. This goal has been subscribed to by various
presidential administrations and Congresses, but only on a very inter
mittent basis.
At the same time that we have adopted cyclical and short-term points
of view with respect to investments and returns, we have become, in the
cities, utterly vulnerable, with a need for a continued, uninterrupted
supply of electrical energy over the long-term. In the past ten years,
sources of electrical power have become enormously expensive in many
parts of the United States. But we have proceeded beyond the point of
no return; we must have a guarantee of uninterruptible electric power.
Because of the resource supply uncertainties of fossil fuel, it appears
logical that, if a means of utilizing solar heat were practicable we ought
to adopt it as one of our methods for providing electric power. Until
1982, one could be skeptical of claims made for central solar thermal
power, as provided by the power tower. But since the installation of Solar
One at Barstow, California, we no longer have the luxury of being doubt
ers. 28 Assured, uninterrupted supplies of electricity, procured by combin
ing centrally generated solar thermal power with other fuels, are only as
far away as the final stages of cost reduction during the manufacturing
process of building solar plants.
FEDERAL INCENTIVES FOR SOLAR POWER

Utilization of government-provided incentives has a long and respect
able history in the United States, as the foregoing analysis has indicated. 29
There is no reason why the incentive system which has been used for
oil, gas, coal, hydroelectric, and nuclear power cannot be extended to
stimulate activity in solar thermal power generation. 30 The introduction
of such incentives, designed specifically to increase the effectiveness of
public utilities in their procurement and distribution of electricity at af
fordable rates, would be a very popular political move. Several private
28. Solomon, SoCal Edison Puts Solar One on Line Fulltime. Abandons Plans for Solar JOO
Project, The Energy Daily, Aug. 29, 1984, at 1-2, col. 1-2.
29. Massachusetts Institute of Technology Energy Laboratory, Government Support for the Com
mercialization of New Energy Technologies (Nov. 1976).
30. SUBCOMM. ON SYNTHETIC FUELS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE BUDGET, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess., ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC INCENTIVES TO STIMULATE A SYNTHETIC FUELS INDUSTRY (Aug. 27,
1979). The report points out that:
The aims of incentives are to improve economics, reduce project risks, and facilitate access to
capital. Economic incentives can be applied to regulated or non-regulated industries, and may be
front-end or production incentives.
In non-regulated industries, tax measures, subsidies, grants, and various guarantees on price,
project completion, and debt may be used. In regulated industries, convention incentives as permitted
by law plus the payment for Construction Work in Progress (CWIP), all-events tariffs, and rolled
in pricing may be used.
Front-end incentives encourage investment in plants by providing or guaranteeing capital, reducing
investment requirements, or guaranteeing project completion. Production incentives focus on the
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enterprises and consortia are prepared to take the necessary steps to
develop commercial versions of the Solar One demonstration plant, once
appropriate incentives are in place. Such incentives as investment credits
for tax returns for plant capital investment, accelerated depreciation write
off periods for plants, and government plants leased to private operators
would be of assistance. Such incentives have been utilized under a number
of past economic and strategic circumstances, and frameworks exist for
their utilization. From a legal point of view, incentives can be installed
by statutory means, and left in place long enough to be effective, then
removed after solar power generation takes its place with other com
mercial sources of energy.
If we are subject again to disruption of fuel supplies because of de
pendence upon foreign sources for fuel, it would be particularly important
to have buttressed our electrical power grid with a strong network of solar
thermal power generators, which are essentially uninterruptible power
sources. This article has sought to make explicit the point that the de
cisions to be taken are not technological, but rather political. Examination
of the statutory and regulatory environment does not reveal insuperable
obstacles to the provision of federally guaranteed incentives, as indicated
above.

viability of plant operations by improving the expected rate of return or reducing marketplace
uncertainties.
Investment tax credits provide cash flow by offsetting a portion of capital requirements, but
corporations must have sufficient other tax liability, that is, income, to utilize an investment tax
credit.
Regulated utilities require that tax credits must be accompanied by tax normalization. State utility
commissions may require that tax benefits flow through to the consumers or rate payers.
Expensing of construction costs increases after-tax income of investors prior to the operation of
the facility. The deduction offsets a portion of the capital investment if the investors have sufficient
other taxable income.
The project rate of return is enhanced substantially, and project risks reduced by shortening the
period required to pay back the net capital investment accumulated at the time of plant start-up.
Accelerated depreciation is effective for high-risk investments.
The impact on federal tax revenues is, of course, with respect to timing, not to the actual dollar
returns to the government during the life of the plant.
Construction grants provide directly to a developer a portion of capital costs, which otherwise
might not be available. Grants may involve equity participation by the federal government, but this
could involve the government in business decisionmaking, not viewed favorably by industry, Grants
may be converted to loans, which would give the government a share in up-side benefits without
giving it equity participation, which may be favored by industry.
Direct loans and loan gurantees make capital available where private sources are not interested,
by means of lower interest rates, longer maturity terms, or higher fractions of debt compared with
equity.
Completion guarantees are highly attractive to industry, which cites regulatory uncertainty as an
important barrier to investment in commercialization projects.
The financial health of regulated utilities can be enhanced substantially by including CWIP in the
ratebase. CWIP provides additional cash flow and reduced external financing requirements. However,
ratepayers have learned to protest this type of incentive as it comes out of their pockets.

